paradoxical remarks. Smith claims that McTaggart mistakenly believes that the original set of terms is contradictory because he infers from
(1) The attribution of the characteristics past, present, and future to the terms of any series leads to a contradiction, unless it is specified that they have them successively to (2) The attribution ofthe characteristics past, present, and future to the terms of any series leads to a contradiction, which is subsequently resolved by specifying that they have them successively.3
Smith then remarks that "This is an invalid inference for a statement of the form A, unless B does not entail a statement ofthe form, A and B."4 Clearly, if McTaggart's paradox is based upon that inference then it is invalid, but there is textual evidence to suggest that McTaggart's belief that the first set of terms never escapes contradiction is not based on that elementary logical blunder.
Smith claims that an appeal to succession nips the problem in the bud, or rather, demonstrates that there is no problem to begin with. Smith makes this point as if McTaggart never thought of it, which of course he did, treating it as the most obvious apparent solution. 5 Virtually all the points that Smith makes in Section One of his paper depend on the assumption that there is no contradiction in something being past, present, and future. But McTaggart thinks that there is a contradiction in temporal attributions. Therefore, if we are to understand McTaggart's paradox we must come to see why he thought that the appeal to succession is futile, involving either a vicious circularity or a vicious infinite regress.
The problem of time and change may be briefly stated as follows: what is the proper analysis of the fact that say, an apple is green at one time and red at a later time, or, synonomously, that an apple is green before it is red? In the facts so stated the apple is first green and then red, and not first red and then green; such is the point of saying that it is green before it is red and that there is change in a given direction. For detensers like myself the direction of time is based on the unanalyzable temporal relation of succession, but for McTaggart temporal relations are analyzable in terms of the flow of time or the moving NOW.6 As McTaggart argues in The Nature 0/ Existence, ... the se ries of earlier and later is a time series. We cannot have time without change, and the only possible change is from future to present, and from present to past. Thus, until the terms are taken as passing from future to present, and from present to past, they cannot be taken as in time, or as earlier or later; and not only the conception of presentness, but those of pastness and futurity must be reached before the conceptions of earlier and later and not vice versa. 7 For McTaggart, temporal relations are not there from the outset but are generated by the moving of the NOW along a non-temporal, but ordered C series.
Further evidence that McTaggart thought of temporal relations as reducible can be gleaned from his remarks in "The Unreality of Time" where he argues that time and change in a particular direction depends upon the Aseries and the C series. As he puts it,
We can now see that the Aseries, together with the C series, is sufficient to give us time. For in order to get change, and change in a given direction, it is sufficient that one position in the C series should be Present, to the exclusion of all others, and that this characteristic of presentness should pass along the se ries in such a way that all positions on the one side of the Present have been present, and all positions on the other side of it will be present. ... no other elements are required to constitute a time-series except an Aseries and a C series.... It is only when the Aseries, which gives change and direction, is combined with the C series, which gives permanence, that the B series can arise. 8 This point cannot be overemphasized: for McTaggart, temporal relations between events are not ultimate, but are analyzable in terms of the moving NOW.
With this background we can begin to understand McTaggart's clain1 that the appeal to succession to avoid the contradiction contained in temporal attributions involves either a vicious circle or a vicious infinite regress. Appealing to succession involves a vicious circle because it assumes the existence of time in order to account for the way in which moments are past, present, and future. Time then must be pre-supposed to account for the Aseries. But we have already seen that the Aseries has to be assumed in order to account for time. Accordingly, the Aseries has to be pre-supposed in order to account for the Aseries. And this is clearly a vicious circle. 9 In short, in order to account for something having incompatible temporal properties the defender of passage must assurne that the term in question has those properties in succession, but in order for a term to be first future, then present, and then past, we must assurne that it has incompatible temporal properties. Thus, one cannot appeal to succession in order to explain how time and change are possible without falling into a vicious circle.
To develop this last point further, recall that an account oftime must provide an account of say, a poker's first being cold and then being hot, or synonomously, its being cold before it is hot. McTaggart's account of change involves the claim that every event in the poker's history changes with respect to the properties of pastness, presentness, and futurity. However, A-changes in events can account for time and avoid the incompatibilities problem only if events acquire and shed A-properties successively. Unfortunately, given McTaggart's positive conception of time that can only mean thatfirst the poker's being cold is present and the poker's being hot is future, and then the poker's being cold is past and the poker's being hot is present, or more simply, that the cold poker is present before the hot poker is present. As the italicized words indicate, however, time or more specifically, the temporal relation of earlier than, must be assumed in order to account for A-changes in events, "but we have already seen that the Aseries has to be assumed in order to account for time"10 (since the B series is defined in terms ofthe application of the Aseries to the C series). Consequently, the contradiction involved in the original Aseries cannot be avoided by appealing to the relation of succession since the Aseries n1ust be assumed in order to account for succession and therefore, since the A series is involved in paradox, succession is too.
McTaggart's difficulty with temporal prediction can be put in another way, in which the fallacy will exhibit itself as a vicious infinite series rather than as a vicious circle. If we avoid the original contradiction by claiming that the terms have the incompatible Aproperties at different times, that is, E is future at tl, present at t2, and past at t3, then the problem is avoided only if tl, t2, and t3 refer to different moments of time. For if the events do not have their Aproperties at different times, then they are either timelessly or simultaneously past, present, and future, and the paradox is unavoidable. What, then, is the basis for tl, t2, and t3 being earlier than t2 and t2 being earlier than t3? Given McTaggart's analysis it can only be that Presentness moves along the series of moments in such a way that each moment is past, present, and future. But then, the contradiction in the (first) level of events rearises at the (second) level of moments. N or is the resolution to be found in postulating another level of moments at which the preceding level can have its temporal properties. For this new series is genuinely temporal only if its terms occur in a given direction, but the direction of aseries is generated by ten1poral attributions which has not and, I submit, cannot be freed from contradiction. 11
It should be clear, therefore, that Smith can hardly be thought to have undermined McTaggart's paradox by simply claiming that it does not arise because incompatible temporal properties are had by events, moments, or whatever, successively. N or has Smith argued, rather than merely claimed, that McTaggart's remarks concerning temporal attributions are paradoxical. What remains to be demonstrated is that Smith's own account of temporal attribution falls prey to precisely the vicious circularity or vicious infinite regress that McTaggart argued was inherent in the nature of tin1e conceived of as involving the moving NOW or passage.
McTaggart claims that since pastness, presentness, and futurity are incompatible properties they cannot belong to the same event simultaneously, but must belong to it successively. N otice that this suggests that McTaggart is not claiming, as Smith maintains, that Htemporal predications are predicated by tenseless copulas, "12 for ifthe copula is tenseless then the temporal properties would not be exemplified at the same time, but would simply be exemplified. Of course, there is a difficulty in the tenseless predication of temporal attributes even if that is not understood as the simultaneous attribution of incompatible properties. But it is equally plausible, if not more so, to treat McTaggart as supposing that ten1poral attributions are predicated by tensed copulas. Thus, we begin with the three statements: "E is now present," and "E is now past," and "E is now future," and these are mutually contradictory unless it is specified that E has these incompatible properties successively.
In tensed language, this means that the event is present, will be past and has been future, or that it is past, and has been future and present, or that it is future and will be present and past. 13 The crucial issue is whether or not this is anything more than a verbal solution to a metaphysical problem. I shall argue that given Smith's analysis of temporal predication the answer is that it· is not since the original contradiction is not avoided but just transferred to different terms.
According to Smith, the reality of temporal attributes implies an infinite regress of inherences of presentness inhering in their own inherences. That is, the correct analysis of "E is present" is (6c) E is present, and the being present of E is present, and the being present of the being present of E is present, and so on infinitely.14 He explains this by saying that the first conjunct of (6c) predicates presentness of the event E and each of the remaining conjuncts predicates presentness of a different inherence of presentness; the second conjunct predicates presentness of the inherencel of presentness in E, the third conjunct predicates presentness of the inherence2 of presentness in its inherence in E, and so on. 15
This passage makes clear that for Smith, inherence exemplifies the temporal attribute ofpresentness. However, ifinherence is present, then it must be past and future as weIl. This does not come out very clearly since in his analysis of "E is past" and "E is future" all the inherence relations are present. Smith says:
The correct explication of"E is past" is (8) Eis past, and the being past of Eis present, and the being present of the being past of E is present, and so on infinitely. An analogous complete explication is given to "E is future. "16 Nevertheless, the inherence relation is past, present, and future and, as I shall argue, the appeal to succession or higher level inherence relations does not enable hirn to avoid the original contradiction involved in the first set of terms.
Suppose we resolve the difficulty of claiming that E is past, present, and future by claiming that it has those attributes successively. E is present, was future and will be past, or it is past, was future and present, or it is future and will be past and present. The copula in each case is tensed and that leads to a difficulty. Consider the first disjunct of conjuncts. If E is present, was future and will be past, then the inherence of presentness is now present, and the inherence of futurity is now past, and the inherence of pastness is now future. Thus,in order to avoid the difficulty of E 's being simultaneously past, present, and future, Smith is a forced to claim that the inherence of a temporal property in E is simultaneously past, present, and future.
Analogous remarks can be made about the other two disjunctions. For example, if Eis now past, and has been present and future, then the inherence of pastness is now present, and the inherence of presentness and futurity is now past. And, finally, if E is future, and will be present and past, then the inherence of futurity is now present, and the inherence of presentness and pastness is now future. In either case, the first order inherence relation has incompatible temporal properties simultaneously. Thus, the notion of succession, analyzed in terms of tensed inherence relations, does not really avoid the contradiction of something being past, present, and future since it rearises at the level of inherence.
It would be of no avail to attempt to avoid the contradiction at the first level of inherence by saying that inherence 1 has its temporal attributes successively. In tensed language that means that inherence 1is present, will be past and has been future, or that it is past, and has been future and present, or that it is future, and will be present and past. However, if, to consider just the first disjunction, inherence 1 is present, will be past and has been future, then given Smith's analysis of the copula it follows that the inherence2 of presentness is now present, the inherence2 of pastness is now future, and the inherence2 of futurity is now past. Thus, McTaggart's problem is simply transferred from the first level of inherence to the second level of inherence. Consequently, the resulting infinite regress is in fact vicious since the original set of terms never escapes from contradiction at all.
One final point. In the second section of his paper Smith argues convincingly that "the various attempts to show that presentness, pastness, and futurity are real but are neither attributes nor regressive are unsuccessful." 17 If his arguments are sound and if my argument against his "way out" of McTaggart's paradox is successful, then we have provided further evidence for the view that the tenser's account of time rationally ought not to be accepted. 18 
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